I’m skeptical about the “phenomenal experience” thingie. It seems to me that it is one of the last hiding places of Cartesianism. But, I probably will leave my pondering on that issue for some other post.
I want here to ask if anyone has idea of how “the experience” is supposed to work in representationalism. As I understand it one of the claims of the representationalism in which it differs from sense-data (qualia) views is the claim of transparency of experience. The transparency thesis, to quote Pete’s formulation from this post on Brain Hammer is this:
When one has a conscious experience all that one is conscious of is what the experience is an experience of.
Now the question that puzzles me is this… If all that one is conscious of are the things that experience is experience of, what about the “experience” itself? Isn’t this supposed to be something that we are aware that we have? But if all that we are aware of are the things that the experience is experience of, what is this “experience” thing (I take it that conscious of can be changed with aware of in this case)? If we can’t become aware of it, how do we know that we have experience? Or is it supposed to be a theoretical concept?