Idealistic Argument For Objectivity of Morality

Something along those lines…

1. World is a rational place. (It makes sense)
2. What is rational can be in principle understood.
3. From 1 and 2 => the world can in principle be understood.
4. Moral judgment of a rational agent in specific situation depends on agent’s understanding of the world (including the understanding of the situation) 
5. From 4 and 3 => because the world in principle can be understood, in principle there is an ideal moral judgment (or… there is objectively right way to act, connected to the full understanding of the world)

If a person A lacks understanding person B has, A might not agree with the moral judgment of B in the concrete situation, but if A understood (or came to understand) what B understands he would agree with the moral judgment of B. As the understanding approaches ideal understanding, the moral judgment approaches ideal moral judgment.

2 thoughts on “Idealistic Argument For Objectivity of Morality

  1. Interesting argument…1 & 2 certainly embody the Anciant conception of the world as a rationally ordered place, but if Quantuum Mechanics is right, thenit looks like premise 1. gets called into question. How does entaglement and superposition make sense?

  2. Thanks Richard,

    Being an idealist (in the limited sense of “world is rational place”), I do buy into points 1 and 2. Though… I’m not that much optimistic to think that it will be *actually* understood, or even that we have the cognitive power to *actually* understand the world. But, I think it is worth to try, and that is my meta-philosophical position – try to understand what’s going on. Of course this wouldn’t make sense, if I think that world doesn’t make sense.

    BTW, I want to point you to my earlier Empiricism as a Form of Idealism post, where I say that this kind of idealistic assumption is kind of necessary.

    It is true that if QM is true then it makes problems to this kind of view, but it might also mean that what we miss is the right interpretation.

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