When grown up person puts his attention to philosophical problems, he starts from a developed theoretical view of the world. Also that person puts his attention to problems which are metaphysical or epistemological, ignoring the whole from which he starts his philosophical discourse.
The philosophy soon figures out that it needs some kind of base, a sure beginning, a set of concepts and/or facts that will serve as a ground of the philosophy.
In last few post, I was presenting the case that being in-the-world, and noticing of things in that world, present a necessary base for philosophical discourse… I’m arguing that the history of anything that “goes on in our head” can be traced back to the noticing of things in the world around us. For sure noticing things in the world, don’t cover the whole issue of epistemology, probably not even just a bit. But this phenomenological base, seems to me, must be accepted. I guess, I need to make additional notice, that when I speak of being in-the-world, I’m talking of phenomenal world, of the world as it is there around us, not any imagined principles of how the world really is.
It might seem at first, that the being in-the-world, and noticing things present not complex enough ground to account for all abstract thought that is obviously possible, be it logic, mathematics, metaphysics even epistemology itself. But let me try to explain why do I think that it is…
As first, we notice things around us. It is not important for now, what makes them objects, nor what makes us notice them. What is important that they must be noticed in order to enter our thought process.
But we notice people too, and we notice that those people can
- notice us
- notice other objects we notice
- interact with us, and those other objects
In this way we notice being together-in-the-world, with other people. They can notice things we notice, and we can notice each other too, and we can notice what others do in the world. Further we don’t notice people as objects, they are active subjects, and further we notice their mental states. The recognition of those mental states in others might be even primarily connected to our own emotions, be it fear, happiness, in direct relation to others, or jealousy for example, when the connection includes the others and also objects. Those are things which can be analyzed in the phenomenology.
However, what is important, is that being in-the-world and noticing things in that world can present base of transcendental inter-subjectivity. What is enough is that notice that other people notice things we notice… (to be continued)