There are things in our perception which attract our attention, and there are also things on which we can end-up being focused on through some kind of willful action (putting our attention to something).
All those things are things that we notice.
We can involuntarily fall into a specific stance towards the things we notice (even we don’t recognize them from before). Children can be attracted toward a thing (e.g. want to look at it, or want to touch it, etc…), or can be afraid of the thing, or interested about the thing, and so on. The stance/feeling toward a thing can provoke reaction on our part and so on… This is simplest case of intentionality/aboutness.
In last post I said that the things which attract our attention and their recognition present a ground for the base level instances and categories. However in general everything that we can notice enriches that same base level of instances and categories we are aware of.
So while a rabbit can attract our attention, we can notice rabbit’s ears too, also its fur. We can notice also such things as a distance between the rabbit and the carrot. We can notice also the number of rabbits (e.g. one, two or three) ,and we can notice the color of the rabbit, and so on… All those things enrich the base level of instances and categories. (as said in last post, for there to be categories, additional capacity of recognition should be present too)
Notice 1: Important question here is how come we notice things that don’t attract our attention.
Notice 2:For thing to attract our attention, it doesn’t need to have mental powers over us :). It is when one starts from representationalist/conceptualist point of view, that “X can attract my attention” will sound like “X have powers to dangle with what is going on in my head”