http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2008/07/26/mind-and-world-note-2/ ....philosophical and other notes.... Mon, 30 Nov 2009 16:52:51 +0000 http://wordpress.com/ hourly 1 http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2008/07/26/mind-and-world-note-2/#comment-36678 Tanasije Gjorgoski Wed, 30 Jul 2008 16:28:13 +0000 http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2008/07/26/mind-and-world-note-2/#comment-36678 Hi Trey... I'm sure I don't know enough how McDowell's system is supposed to work to comment on what you said, but I will try :). If for McDowell the world is represented as being thus and so (and that is what the conceptual contribution to experience amounts to), and if the world is thus and so (so, can be spoken of in terms of those same concepts which are included in the experience), then it is fully possible that the world is as it is represented in our experience - We might never know with absolute certainty that the world is as it is represented, but that shouldn't be a problem, right? But then probably I don't understand what you are pointing to. Hi Trey…
I’m sure I don’t know enough how McDowell’s system is supposed to work to comment on what you said, but I will try :). If for McDowell the world is represented as being thus and so (and that is what the conceptual contribution to experience amounts to), and if the world is thus and so (so, can be spoken of in terms of those same concepts which are included in the experience), then it is fully possible that the world is as it is represented in our experience – We might never know with absolute certainty that the world is as it is represented, but that shouldn’t be a problem, right?
But then probably I don’t understand what you are pointing to.

]]> http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2008/07/26/mind-and-world-note-2/#comment-36666 Trey Mon, 28 Jul 2008 03:46:08 +0000 http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2008/07/26/mind-and-world-note-2/#comment-36666 To say that one always has some conceptual content in experience DOES NOT put one in any kind of position to view the layout of reality...geez. If your experience of the world includes conceptual content then there is a contribution to the contents of experience by you..which means that in order to know the layout of reality you have to be able to separate what comes from you and what comes from the world. But how can you do this if even your distinction itself comes from your conceptual frame of reference? And the passage itself admits there is nothing for such a distinction to refer to...so then you just assume that the result is that the world itself must follow these conceptual takes on that world? Actually what I see here is full blown skepticism. Has this implication of his world view simply been ignored? To say that one always has some conceptual content in experience DOES NOT put one in any kind of position to view the layout of reality…geez. If your experience of the world includes conceptual content then there is a contribution to the contents of experience by you..which means that in order to know the layout of reality you have to be able to separate what comes from you and what comes from the world. But how can you do this if even your distinction itself comes from your conceptual frame of reference? And the passage itself admits there is nothing for such a distinction to refer to…so then you just assume that the result is that the world itself must follow these conceptual takes on that world? Actually what I see here is full blown skepticism. Has this implication of his world view simply been ignored?

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