Comments on: Cartesian Externalism

By: Tanasije Gjorgoski

Tanasije Gjorgoski — Mon, 19 May 2008 19:13:30 +0000

Thanks for pointing to those Clark. I myself am skeptical of the possibility of the Boltzmann brains or swampman, or at least, I don’t think I have enough knowledge of what we are in order to be able (given that I’m not a physicalist) to say that those scenarios are possible or not.
However what makes the perpetual illusion scenario different for me, is that it takes a body or a brain as we know it and put it in the situation which is, seems to me, fully possible. As from the virtual reality scenarios, it is pretty clear that there could be illusions of visual or auditory experiences. Of course, there are some problems, like experiences of drinking alcohol, but I think nothing which can’t be provided to the body or brain in the vat.

By: Clark

Clark — Mon, 19 May 2008 16:08:04 +0000

BTW – relative to the swampman there is the interesting debate in science about Boltzman brains which end up being the same thing.

By: Tanasije Gjorgoski

Tanasije Gjorgoski — Wed, 14 May 2008 09:16:48 +0000

Yes, I guess you are right about that thought experiment being similar to Davidson’s swampman. Though, it seems to me that this ‘virtual reality by chance’ doesn’t go as far, as the subject is not created at a point at time, the memories are subject’s memories, and so on… just that the subject is subject of perpetual illusion created by chance. That’s why I think it’s possibility is easier to accept.

Of course, it isn’t plausible that after connecting random generators to a brain in a vat ‘virtual reality by chance’, especially one that lasts a lifetime, contains other people, and so on could happen. But I don’t see why would one think that it isn’t possible.

The whole system consisting of random input generators, the brain and the vat, might of course be kept in working state by humans in real world, machines or whatever, so I don’t see how entropy would make it impossible.

By: Clark

Clark — Wed, 14 May 2008 06:46:39 +0000

This issue of chance seems merely a different way of retelling Davidson’s swampman thought experiment. I’m confess that I find both a bit unconvincing simply because I don’t think that by chance something coherent like that could happen. Put an other way I have a hard time thinking these thought experiments without thinking about entropy.

By: Tanasije Gjorgoski

Tanasije Gjorgoski — Wed, 14 May 2008 00:49:45 +0000

Hi Clark,

I fully agree that in the cases of usual virtual reality scenarios, externalist can point to the relations between what is presented to the subject within the virtual reality, and the outside world. In those cases, we could say that virtual reality is creating illusions of things which are either mimicking real things (or real kinds of things) or maybe fictional things. In both cases, they will be related to the reality, and hence externalist can tell a story about how the meaning of the words of a subject within this virtual reality is connected to the real phenomena (or imagination of real people).

But, I think the case where one is brain in a vat, and where the illusions are result of pure chance (so, they are not deliberate illusions created by other people) , make such stories impossible to tell for externalist. And I think those scenarios are also possible. I don’t see anything contradictory about the idea that every experience in my life, is nothing but result of random inputs which by pure chance resulted in an illusion that i have had the life that I think I have had. And still, if I’m now in such situation, I would still hold that what I write on this blog, is meaningful (while it would be true that I wouldn’t be in any kind of relation with any society, and while I wouldn’t have had seen any human, or object, or house, or tree, or water, etc…).

By: Clark

Clark — Tue, 13 May 2008 23:01:52 +0000

I think in the context of virtual reality that one can’t neglect that the virtual reality is virtual of something. Let’s say they have horses. Well if you woke up from the matrix and then saw a real horse you’d recognize it and say, “ah, that’s what they were mimicking.” But let’s say in your virtual reality there was a dragon. You might, upon reading history, realize there were no dragons and that the term has no referent.

The point is that meaning can be either to something real or something purely mental. But we’re able to make the distinction. Just because we may not be able to at one point doesn’t meant the distinction is irrelevant. (Which is what I take certain classes of internalists to be asserting) Of course some internalists can just say that meaning is holistic to deal with this. i.e. the meaning of horse as I learn it is contextually related to the concept of a real world. If we find out that we’re not in the real world then clearly what I once used the terms to refer is now recognized as the improper reference.