Thanks for the answers.

You say that you never been able to discover a sensation myself. I’m inclined to say that too, though I guess the issue is the stance one takes towards perception. It is not hard to imagine what others mean by those “sensations” or “sense datum”. One just needs to think of visual perception as virtual reality goggles or something made up from pixels. And then thinks of those pixels as sensations. So, the thing is not about what we do or fail to experience (at least not in those issues I think), or what we discover, but how do we interpret something of which I guess we are all aware.

You are right that this doesn’t answer my questions, but you bring up interesting issues.

One I find particularly interesting is related to your last paragraph.
Namely, if I understand it right,it is how transparency of experience (as present in intentionalists – the idea that when we have experience, we are aware of what the experience is experience of) might open some way for a priori thought.
There is a little complication there, because for a priori thought we need abstract notions, and usually in case of perception we think of awareness in terms of *this* or *that* – some particulars. But anyway, I’m inclined to agree about the importance of the transparency of experience for a priori thought.

Also thanks for the reference to Michael Polanyi’s book.

Later I believe he dropped the talk of contents in this sense. But that supposedly occurs in his works on internal time consciousness (and I’m not familiar with those). There he speaks of “impressions” but doesn’t mean that in the Brittish Empiricist sense (= “sensations”).

A reflex act is an intention directed upon the consciousness to which it itself belongs. I, personally, have never been able to discover a sensation myself. I think that may be why Husserl eventually decided they were unnecessary for the description of consciousness.

But I speak here off the top of my head.

(Also, please note the Husserl was before the Analytic/Continental split, so what goes for Analytic Intentionalists (Searle?) may not go for Husserl and vice versa).

Your point that model and the real will not always be in full agreement is interesting. But is it necessarily true? Can’t we imagine a model which will represent certain aspect of reality fully?

This is what I meant by the “relevant real”; take for instance an anthropological model of “What it means to be a Christian” or “Islam in Precis”. At best each can give a summation of the two religions using a subset of the whole (likely using the most dominant sect from each). For Christianity this may be Catholicism (as opposed to protestantism…both of which have many sects) or Sunnism for Muslims. There will be quite a bit of fact and truth in each assessment, but as can be surmised it is very high-level (these models) and should not be applied to every Christian or Muslim one meets.

I completely agree with you saying that model represents just certain aspect, and I get the examples you point to. Would you say that that what is measurable/scientific is also an aspect of reality?

certainly; read Michael Polanyi’s Pure Knowledge.

You say: “The quality of the representation in fulfilling its designed purpose answers your questions; certainly knowing where the model falls apart gives higher appreciation for what is being symbolized (the mapping) as something far more complex than can be simplified, but the model with limited additional knowledge can be fully sufficient to describe the relevant real within its limited purpose.”

I do agree with you on this. But it doesn’t answer my questions (maybe it should, but I don’t see it). Because, both phenomenalists and intentionalists use word “representation”, but I can’t see how this can be related to a representation which serves for us to interprete something *as something else*. In phenomenalists view, it seems that we are don’t have idea of that “something else”, and hence it can’t be the case that we interprete qualia *as something else*. In, intentionalist view, the best I can understand, is that some unconscious process interprets some unconscious mental state as something else, but that already requires that ‘interpretting unconscious process’ to have intristic intentionality towards things in the world, because just in that way it can serve the purpose of interpreting some representation as that thing in the world. Again, maybe this isn’t what intentionalists are saying, and I’m hoping someone will say… no, you got this, and this and this wrong… they think that…, etc…

a priori and a posteriori come to mind. It seems that the implication of phenomenalism is one in which the a posteriori pursuit is important and necessary where as in intentionalism the a priori is assumed. In either case the quality of the model in fulfilling its function is tantamount and demonstrates its value in both. In the a priori system, a model is required that seamlessly demonstrates the relevant-real; if additional knowledge is required, then the representation fails and nothing is conveyed; the representation is therefore not representative at all for the relevant-real is left unknown. Here it seems that the intrinsic mapping is most important rather than the accuracy of the model (from a literary perspective this seems to be akin to the metaphoric); the representation in this system must result in a leap beyond itself to the real. In regards to the a posteriori model, the quality is derived in the veracity of the mapping itself whether or not the linkage is immediately available to the observer. Nonetheless, both systems demonstrate the necessity for quality models to satisfy there ends; both of which intend to point to something else. The question becomes within their intentions do they satisfy that end. One asks can the real be implied from the representation (a posteriori), while the other asks will the real be implied by the representation (a priori).

You didn’t repeat anything that was said.
Thanks for the reference to McDowell… sounds as an interesting way to “solve” the problem of representationalism. It does sound strange to me too.

So when you say, you have a problem figuring out the how the intentionlist is compatable with transparancy, i agree that there is a problem there. And i claim that the intentionalist has no good story to tell…. There are of course options. McDowell deals with it by by claiming that the world is to be sliced up into facts, (rather then things) and then claim that the representational content of a veridical perception is the fact and thus a bit of the world. I find this a hard pill to swallow.

Interesting parallel you draw there with Husserl. He didn’t buy any kind of representationalism, right?

You say “When you read you both see and understand the words. But when you see, you don’t sense your sensations (whatever that is) and the object you’re seeing.”
I agree that we are not sensing (or seeing) sensations. What we see is the object.

However, I have problem in figuring out how do intentionalists apply the notion of representation so that it is compatible with this conclusion.

BTW, you also say “But that doesn’t mean the sensations aren’t part of your experience, and can’t be thought about in a “reflexive” act.”
If we can’t see the sensations, how do we know that they are there? What is this “reflexive act”?

I think you are pointing that if we have multiple representations (models), we can somehow use those against each other.
Or… that somehow through multiple representations we can somehow synthesize reality?
There is something interesting here, though I don’t know what. :)

Your point that model and the real will not always be in full agreement is interesting. But is it necessarily true? Can’t we imagine a model which will represent certain aspect of reality fully?

I completely agree with you saying that model represents just certain aspect, and I get the examples you point to. Would you say that that what is measurable/scientific is also an aspect of reality?

You say: “The quality of the representation in fulfilling its designed purpose answers your questions; certainly knowing where the model falls apart gives higher appreciation for what is being symbolized (the mapping) as something far more complex than can be simplified, but the model with limited additional knowledge can be fully sufficient to describe the relevant real within its limited purpose.”

I do agree with you on this. But it doesn’t answer my questions (maybe it should, but I don’t see it). Because, both phenomenalists and intentionalists use word “representation”, but I can’t see how this can be related to a representation which serves for us to interprete something *as something else*. In phenomenalists view, it seems that we are don’t have idea of that “something else”, and hence it can’t be the case that we interprete qualia *as something else*. In, intentionalist view, the best I can understand, is that some unconscious process interprets some unconscious mental state as something else, but that already requires that ‘interpretting unconscious process’ to have intristic intentionality towards things in the world, because just in that way it can serve the purpose of interpreting some representation as that thing in the world. Again, maybe this isn’t what intentionalists are saying, and I’m hoping someone will say… no, you got this, and this and this wrong… they think that…, etc…

Husserl’s understanding of epistemology would fall under what you call “intentionalism.” But I think the radar/plan example wouldn’t work to explain his theory.

I believe Husserl would say that what we do in the case of a radar screen is closer to what we do when we understand a word than when we experience “sense data” (whatever that is). When you read you both see and understand the words. But when you see, you don’t sense your sensations (whatever that is) and the object you’re seeing.

But that doesn’t mean the sensations aren’t part of your experience, and can’t be thought about in a “reflexive” act.

Keep in mind that models are often tools designed for a single purpose; when applied outside of that purpose the model’s veracity begins to degrade. We do not use models to describe the real, only an aspect of the real. When taken by themselves, the experiments of James Maxwell showed light to be a wave; this did not end the debate for light also expresses a particle like behavior. Additionally, Heisenberg proved that at best we can only model the orbit of electrons around the nucleus of a molecule and can never isolate their respective position and speed.

Representative models, must be taken both to describe in pedantic terms what is observable/scientific (summarizing, hopefully, succinctly a complex system) and as valid only up to a given point. The quality of the representation in fulfilling its designed purpose answers your questions; certainly knowing where the model falls apart gives higher appreciation for what is being symbolized (the mapping) as something far more complex than can be simplified, but the model with limited additional knowledge can be fully sufficient to describe the relevant real within its limited purpose.