<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:georss="http://www.georss.org/georss" xmlns:geo="http://www.w3.org/2003/01/geo/wgs84_pos#" xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Concepts, Phenomena and Analyticity</title>
	<atom:link href="http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/05/04/concepts-phenomena-and-analyticity/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/05/04/concepts-phenomena-and-analyticity/</link>
	<description>....philosophical and other notes....</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Mon, 30 Nov 2009 16:52:51 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<generator>http://wordpress.com/</generator>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
		<item>
		<title>By: Tanasije Gjorgoski</title>
		<link>http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/05/04/concepts-phenomena-and-analyticity/#comment-14010</link>
		<dc:creator>Tanasije Gjorgoski</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 May 2007 23:26:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/05/04/concepts-phenomena-and-analyticity/#comment-14010</guid>
		<description>Hi Brandon,

What I meant to point to by saying &quot;&lt;i&gt;part&lt;/i&gt; of what bachelor means&quot; is the containment relationship between the concepts, but I think that you are right that the way I formulated is confusing.

Thanks for explaining the reasons why math couldn&#039;t be analytic in Kant. I knew that for him it was synthetic, and that it is one of the differences with later analytic/synthetic divide in logical empiricists, but I wasn&#039;t aware that those were the reasons.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Brandon,</p>
<p>What I meant to point to by saying &#8220;<i>part</i> of what bachelor means&#8221; is the containment relationship between the concepts, but I think that you are right that the way I formulated is confusing.</p>
<p>Thanks for explaining the reasons why math couldn&#8217;t be analytic in Kant. I knew that for him it was synthetic, and that it is one of the differences with later analytic/synthetic divide in logical empiricists, but I wasn&#8217;t aware that those were the reasons.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Brandon</title>
		<link>http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/05/04/concepts-phenomena-and-analyticity/#comment-14008</link>
		<dc:creator>Brandon</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 May 2007 22:56:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/05/04/concepts-phenomena-and-analyticity/#comment-14008</guid>
		<description>&lt;i&gt;So, in this Kantian/classical concepts picture the idea is this: if we accept that it is a part of what bachelor means that it is male and not married; obviously by virtue of that meaning “all bachelors are not married” will be true.&lt;/i&gt;

I&#039;m not sure this is quite right. After all, part of what 12 means is 7+5; but that, as Kant insisted, is not analytic at all, but synthetic. The reason is that Kant did not invent the sense of &#039;analytic&#039; with which he is working -- he gets it from Wolff&#039;s scholasticized Leibnizianism. And in that system, there are two crucial elements that constrain what concepts can be analytically contained in other concepts: the concepts can&#039;t overlap, they can&#039;t repeat, and they must together constitute an exhaustive division. That is, two concepts can only be contained in another concept analytically as a single genus in a species; the only way two concepts can both contain another concept is if they share it as a single genus; and they must be distinguished in such a way that all the species-level concepts give all the possible differentia that can attach to the genus-level concepts. As Kant recognized, it is impossible to place most mathematical concepts in an analytic scheme like this. 12 = 7+5, but it also = 6+6, etc.; to handle this you&#039;d have to break all three rules. So addition statements must be not analytic but synthetic, not an analysis of concepts but a construction upon them. 

This, of course, is not the traditional analytic/synthetic divide as we usually think of it, so we perhaps need to keep in mind that there is more than one possible account of what the divide even is.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>So, in this Kantian/classical concepts picture the idea is this: if we accept that it is a part of what bachelor means that it is male and not married; obviously by virtue of that meaning “all bachelors are not married” will be true.</i></p>
<p>I&#8217;m not sure this is quite right. After all, part of what 12 means is 7+5; but that, as Kant insisted, is not analytic at all, but synthetic. The reason is that Kant did not invent the sense of &#8216;analytic&#8217; with which he is working &#8212; he gets it from Wolff&#8217;s scholasticized Leibnizianism. And in that system, there are two crucial elements that constrain what concepts can be analytically contained in other concepts: the concepts can&#8217;t overlap, they can&#8217;t repeat, and they must together constitute an exhaustive division. That is, two concepts can only be contained in another concept analytically as a single genus in a species; the only way two concepts can both contain another concept is if they share it as a single genus; and they must be distinguished in such a way that all the species-level concepts give all the possible differentia that can attach to the genus-level concepts. As Kant recognized, it is impossible to place most mathematical concepts in an analytic scheme like this. 12 = 7+5, but it also = 6+6, etc.; to handle this you&#8217;d have to break all three rules. So addition statements must be not analytic but synthetic, not an analysis of concepts but a construction upon them. </p>
<p>This, of course, is not the traditional analytic/synthetic divide as we usually think of it, so we perhaps need to keep in mind that there is more than one possible account of what the divide even is.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Tanasije Gjorgoski</title>
		<link>http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/05/04/concepts-phenomena-and-analyticity/#comment-13989</link>
		<dc:creator>Tanasije Gjorgoski</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 May 2007 15:53:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/05/04/concepts-phenomena-and-analyticity/#comment-13989</guid>
		<description>Yes, seems so to me.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, seems so to me.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Clark</title>
		<link>http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/05/04/concepts-phenomena-and-analyticity/#comment-13988</link>
		<dc:creator>Clark</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 May 2007 15:47:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/05/04/concepts-phenomena-and-analyticity/#comment-13988</guid>
		<description>So would you say that if one rejects the traditional sense of concepts that then Kant&#039;s notion of analyticness falls apart?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So would you say that if one rejects the traditional sense of concepts that then Kant&#8217;s notion of analyticness falls apart?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
